We investigate a general class of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols using one-way classical communication. We show that full security can be proven by considering only collective attacks. We derive computable lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate of those QKD protocols involving only entropies of two-qubit density operators. As an illustration of our results, we determine new bounds for the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the 6-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols. We show that in all these cases the first classical processing that the legitimate partners should apply consists in adding noise.
Quantum cryptography, the art of exploiting quantum physics to defeat any possible eavesdropper, has rapidly grown over the past decade from the level of a nice idea into an entire branch of physics [1] . Indeed, the first commercial equipment are already offered [2] .
A generic quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol can be divided into two parts: (I) distribution of quantum information and measurement, and (II) a classical part consisting in parameter estimation (PE) and classical postprocessing (CPP). To implement the quantum part of the protocol, the two legitimate persons, Alice (A) and Bob (B), agree on some encoding or decoding procedure [3] . We denote by S 0 fj 0 j ig j2J and S 1 fj 1 j ig j2J , where J f1; . . . ; mg, the sets of states used to encode the bit values 0 and 1, respectively. First, A sends n qubits prepared at random in the state j . The adversary, Eve (E), interacts now with all the qubits sent by A. She applies a unitary transformation (since she is restricted to the laws of quantum mechanics) to all those qubits and an ancilla in the state j0i. The state of E and B is then given by j i j i BE U BE j i j i B j0i E . Next, B applies some filtering operation, which might be unitary as in the case of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) or the 6-state protocol, and measures his qubits in the z basis. A and B compare publicly which encoding or decoding operation they used and keep only those pairs of qubits where they were compatible (sifting). The state describing E's system is j i;k j i E hkjB j U BE j i j i B j0i E , where we denoted by B the filtering operation used by B and by k his z-measurement outcome [5] . A and B now compare publicly some of their measurement outcomes to estimate the quantum bit error rate (QBER).
The security of the protocol relies on the fact that E, trying to gain information about the bit values, introduces some errors due to the laws of quantum mechanics. However, any realistic channel used by A and B is noisy, i.e., QBER > 0. In order to ensure that the protocol is secure, one must assume that all the noise (estimated by A and B) is due to an unlimited eavesdropping attack, a coherent attack [6, 7] . A and B know how to counter such an adversary: they apply a CPP, consisting in error correction (EC) and privacy amplification (PA). This general principle leaves a central question open: How much error can be tolerated in order to be able to distill a secret key? This is precisely what we concentrate on in this Letter.
Many security proofs are based on the following observations [8] [9] [10] [11] . Instead of preparing a system and then sending it to B, A can equivalently prepare B's system at a distance by using an entangled state (entanglement-based scheme [12] ) [13] . If A and B could distill their state to singlets, their systems cannot be entangled to E. The essential feature of the distillation can be carried out processing only classical data, leading to perfectly correlated data.
We present here a different kind of security proof, which is not based on entanglement distillation and that applies to a general class of QKD protocols including the BB84, the 6-state, and the Bennett 1992 (B92) protocols [14 -16] . First of all, we determine the state shared by A and B (using the entanglement-based scheme) after a general eavesdropping attack. Then we analyze the classical part of the protocol, i.e., PE and CPP, for the case of one-way communication. We present a new formula for the secretkey length. Then we derive a lower bound on the secret-key rate involving only entropies of two-qubit density operators. We also present an upper bound on the secret-key rate. At the end we illustrate our results by determining new values for the lower bounds on the secret-key rate for the protocols mentioned above. These new bounds are generally stronger than those achievable with entanglementbased security proofs.
To study the entanglement-based scheme, we use the same notation as before and define the encoding operators A j j0ih for the B92 protocol. After applying one of those encoding or decoding operations, A and B measure in the z basis, associating with the outcome the bit values 0 or 1. Using the facts that A T 1j i 1 Aj i for any operator A and j i 1= 2 p j00i j11i and that the operators applied on A's systems commute with the operator applied by E, it is easy to verify that j i;k
To account for all the different realizations (j), we introduce a new system R 1 and define the state j 0 i ABER
, with p j determined by the probability with which A and B decide to keep the systems in case they used the operators A j , B j . Now, first of all, R 1 measures and obtains the outcome j. The state shared by A, B, and E is then j j i ABE .
Let us now introduce an equivalent protocol where A and B additionally apply the following operations [17] : (I) A and B both apply the same unitary transformation U 1 0 chosen for each qubit at random among U 1 1, U 2 z , with the Pauli operator z . The state describing E's system is then, up to a global phase, equivalent to j i 2 f1; 2g, and V 1 1, V 2 x . Since we assume that both apply the same operation, they need to coordinate their actions via classical communication. This exchanged classical information is denoted by l. (III) A and B are also free to permute their bits, i.e., qubits before the measurement in the z basis. Obviously, they have to use the same permutation operator, P m . The classical information that has to be exchanged is denoted by m.
We introduce now two random number generators, R 2 and R 3 , which account, respectively, for the operators, O l and P m . The state describing all the systems is ji ABER 1 R 2 R 3 j;l;m 1 p j p j j;l;m i ABE jji R 1 jli R 2 jmi R 3 , with j j;l;m i ABE PmO l A j PmO l B j U BE j i n AB j0i E , the state shared by A, B, and E for the particular realization j; l; m.
Let us now relax the assumptions about E. We provide E with all the systems R 1 , R 2 , R 3 . Since she can measure the R systems ending up in the same situation as before [E knows the classical information j; l; m], we clearly provide her with at least as much power as she had before. The state A and B share is given by the partial trace of the state ji ABER 1 R 2 R 3 over E; R 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 . We find n AB P S fD n 2 D n 1 0 AB g, where the normalized state 0 AB tr E P j 0 i with j 0 i U BE j i n AB j0i E . Here, and in the following, we use the notation P ji jihj for any state ji. P S denotes the completely positive map (CPM) symmetrizing the state with respect to all qubit pairs. The CPM D 1 is entirely defined by the protocol and is given by
D 2 is independent of the protocol, and is defined as
e., the depolarization map transforming any two-qubit state into a Bell-diagonal state. This implies that the density operator A and B share, before their measurement in the z basis, has for any protocol the simple form
Here, the sum is performed such that n 4 n ÿ n 1 ÿ n 2 ÿ n 3 , with n i 0. The states j 1=2 (1) is independent of the CPP; thus, it can also be used in order to investigate any protocol employing two-way CPP.
Let us summarize this part of the Letter. Let AB be a density operator, which is measured by A and B in a certain basis (say, the z basis). Assume that E has a purification of AB ; i. In order to analyze the classical part of the protocol, we partially use some of the information-theoretic arguments [18, 19] , which have first been proposed in [20] in order to analyze the security of a large class of QKD protocols [21] . We assume that A (B) hold strings X n (Y n ), obtained by measuring a given state n AB , Eq. (1). Let us consider the CPP consisting of three steps. The protocol is one-way, i.e., only communication from, say A to B, is needed. (I) Preprocessing: Using her bit string X n , A computes two strings U n and V n , according to given conditional probability distributions P UjX and P VjU , respectively. She keeps U n and sends V n to B. (II) Information reconciliation: A computes error correcting information W from U n and sends W to B. Using his information, Y n and W, B computes a guessÛ n for U n . [18] .
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To determine the number ' " n of "-secure key bits that can be generated by the above protocol, we use the following recent results: (I) The amount of key that can be extracted from a string U n is given by the uncertainty of the adversary about U n , measured in terms of the so-called smooth Rényi entropy, S " 0 2 ; S " 0 0 [18] , as introduced in [22] . (II) The amount of information B needs to correct his errors, using optimal error correction, is given by his uncertainty about A's string (again measured in terms of the smooth Rényi entropy). Combining those results we find for the number of "-secure bits [23] ,
where '''' means that equality holds up to some small term independent of n and " 0 is a function of " that vanishes as " tends to zero. In this formula, n UEV is the density operator describing the string U n together with the adversary's knowledge [24] . The supremum is taken over all preprocessing applied by A.
We show now how a lower bound on the secret rate, r: lim n!1 ' " n =n, can be determined considering only twoqubit density operators. To this aim, we first of all fix some preprocessing by A. We assume that it is bitwise; i.e., for each bit value X i she computes U i and V i [25] . At the end we take the supremum with respect to all those preprocessings.
Because of the symmetry (with respect to the qubit pairs) of the state n AB we can assume, without loss of generality, that the first n p:e: qubits are used for the PE and the rest, n data , are used to generate the key. Choosing n p:e sufficiently large guarantees that the data qubits contain the same amount of error as estimated in the PE phase. Since the only free parameters of n AB are its eigenvalues n 1 ;n 2 ;n 3 ;n 4 the outcome of the PE implies very strong conditions on them [Eq. (1)]. In fact, conditioned on this outcome, the data qubits can be described by some state n jQ , where Q n 1 ; n 2 ; n 3 ; n 4 =n is the frequency distribution (depending on the PE outcome) of a Bell measurement. The state n jQ has similar properties as the product state n Q , where Q is a two-qubit Bell-diagonal state with eigenvalues Q. Because of this similarity, one can show that the smooth Rényi entropies of those states are the same. Finally, using the fact that the smooth Rényi entropy of a product state is asymptotically equal to the von Neumann entropy [22] , we obtain the following lower bound on the secret rate [23] :
In this formula, SUjVE denotes the von Neumann entropy of U conditioned on V and E, i.e., SUjVE : S UVE ÿ S VE . The state UVE is obtained from AB by taking a purification ABE of the Bell-diagonal state D 2 D 1 AB , i.e., Eq. (1) for n 1, and applying the measurement of A followed by the classical channels U X and V U. Similarly, Y is the outcome of B's measurement applied to the second subsystem of ABE . The set ÿ QBER contains all two-qubit states, , for which the protocol computes a secret key when starting with the state n , where is any state that A and B might share after a collective attack by E. Thus, in order to prove full security for this class of QKD protocols one has to consider only collective attacks. Note that, in order to compute a lower bound, V can be discarded. A priori, one might think that also the preprocessing X ! U could not be of any help, since the only choice A has is to flip each bit value with some probability, i.e., to introduce noise. However, this noise differs clearly from the channel's noise. Although it diminishes A's mutual information with B, it may more severely penalize E.
In order to derive this bound, we assume that Eve has a purification of the state , which is always possible as long as the encoding or decoding operators (A j ; B j ) are unitary. This implies that, for instance, for the BB84 and the 6-state protocols, coherent attacks are not more powerful than collective attacks [26] .
Because of the fact that the states D 2 D 1 ÿ QBER are measured in the z basis, we have 1 1 ÿ Q ÿ 2 ; 4 Q ÿ 3 , where Q QBER, denotes the averaged error (with respect to the errors occurring in the different bases). The considered protocol, i.e., the map D 1 , implies then additional conditions on the 's. Using similar ideas, one can derive the same bound as in Eq. (2), but with ABE being the purification D 2 AB . ÿ QBER could then be defined as the set of two-qubit density operators leading to the same error in the different bases [23] .
Using techniques from quantum information theory, one can show that if the supremum on the right-hand side of Eq. (2) is also taken over any quantum state UV computed from X, then it is also an upper bound for the rate r, i.e., r min sup V U X S UEV ÿ S EV ÿ HUjVY, where the minimum is taken over all states ABE that can be generated by an attack of E [27] .
Let us now illustrate our result for several protocols. For the BB84 protocol the encoding or decoding operators are A 1 B 1 V x and A 2 B 2 1, where V x is the Hadamard transformation. It is easy to verify that D 2 D 1 0 1 ÿ Q ÿ 1 P j i 1 P j ÿ i 1 P j i Q ÿ 1 P j ÿ i with 0 1 Q for any state 0 . We find for the optimal values 1 Q ÿ Q 2 and q ! 0:5, the probability for A to flip the bit value, that the secret-key rate is positive for all Q 0:124. Without the preprocessing by A, we would obtain the well-known bound 0.110 [8, 20] . For the upper bound we obtain the known result that the protocol is not secure if the QBER is higher than 0.146 [28] . For the 6-state protocol we find that the secret-key rate is positive as long as Q < 0:141 (known result 0.127 [9] ). On the other hand, the protocol is insecure for all Q 0:162. For the B92 protocol we find a positive rate as long as 0:027 (known result 0:024 [10, 20] ), where characterizes the depolarization of a channel introducing the same amount of noise.
Before we conclude, let us note that if we would restrict E to individual attacks [6] , Eq. (2) would be, apart from the preprocessing, equivalent to the bound widely studied and sometimes called Csiszár and Körner bound. Also in this simplified case the preprocessing turns out to be important. For instance, for the 6-state protocol numerical optimization shows that for all nonzero QBERs it is always advantageous for A to first add some noise to her data, before the EC and PA.
To conclude, we studied the security of a class of QKD protocols, including BB84, 6-state, and B92 protocols, among many others. We presented a new security proof not based on entanglement distillation for all those protocols using one-way CPP. We show that in order to prove full security one has only to consider collective attacks. We derived a computable lower bound on the secret-key rate involving only entropies of two-qubit density operators. It is shown that A should add noise before the EC and PA phases. The state A and B share before the EC and PA is then separable, which might prevent an entanglementbased proof of security to work there. We illustrated our results by presenting new bounds on all the protocols mentioned above.
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